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DO JURORS UNDERSTAND
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS?
ANALYZING THE RESULTS OF THE
MICHIGAN JUROR
COMPREHENSION PROJECT*
Geoffrey P. Kramer** and Dorean M. Koenig***
In our jury system, laypersons rather than legal experts deter-
mine the guilt or innocence of persons accused of crime by ap-
plying legal standards provided by a judge in the form of jury
instructions. The complexity of some legal standards raises con-
cern about the jurors' ability to perform their duties. Their re-
sponsibilities can be divided into three parts. First, jurors must
determine the facts in the case before them.' Second, they must
* A grant from the Michigan State Bar Foundation and royalties from the Michigan
Criminal Jury Instructions Committee of the State Bar of Michigan funded the project
described in this Article. The Juror Comprehension Project (the "Project") is a
subcommittee of the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions Committee, a standing
committee of the State Bar of Michigan. The Project was chaired by Professor Dorean
M. Koenig, coauthor of this Article, and relied on the expertise of Michigan State
University Professor Norbert Kerr, who was instrumental in developing the study
discussed in this Article. For a list of Project members and a discussion of the origin of
the Project and the Michigan Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, see Koenig, Kerr &
Van Hoek, Michigan Standard Criminal Jury Instructions: Judges' Perspectives After
Ten Years' Use, 4 COOLEY L. REV. 347 (1987).
We thank all the members of the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions Committee for
their assistance in constructing the questionnaire. We especially thank Joe Kimble and
Janice Spodarek for work on the questionnaire and Judge William Caprathe, Dawn Van
Hoek, and Elizabeth Jacobs for facilitating contact with various courts. We are also
greatly indebted to Professor Norbert Kerr who provided valuable assistance throughout.
We are very grateful to the judges, clerks, and officers of the Detroit Recorder's Court
and the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit Court of Lansing for their assistance in this Project
and without whose help it could not have been done. For the additional assistance and
enthusiasm of Judges Gershwin A. Drain and Clarice Jobes, who found time in their very
busy schedules for this Project, we wish to give special thanks.
** Faculty Lecturer, Indiana University at Kokomo. B.S., Central Michigan Univer-
sity, 1975; M.A., Central Michigan University, 1977; Ph.D., Michigan State University,
expected 1990. Mr. Kramer's background is in clinical and social psychology. He worked
as a staff psychologist at the state prison in Jackson, MI from 1978 to 1984.
*** Professor, Thomas M. Cooley Law School. Ph.B., University of Detroit, 1956;
J.D., University of Detroit Law School, 1967. Ms. Koenig is the original reporter of the
Michigan Standard Criminal Jury Instructions and the author of the Commentaries. She
is the chairperson of the subcommittee of the Michigan State Bar Committee on Stan-
dard Criminal Jury Instructions, which undertook the project reported in this article.
1. Jurors perform this function capably. See, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMER-
ICAN JURY 149 (1966).
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learn the relevant legal standards from the judge. Finally, they
must apply those standards to the facts of the case. Confusion
over the meaning of judicial instructions undermines the jurors'
ability to fulfill their second function, that of learning the legal
standards, and consequently affects their application of the law
to the facts. The study of 600 actual jurors discussed in this Ar-
ticle sought to determine whether jurors are able to learn the
law from complex instructions.2 The study's data support the
view that juror understanding of judicial instructions is flawed
and that changes in the wording and presentation of judicial in-
structions may be required to improve juror comprehension.3
The use of laypersons to convict or acquit accused criminals
was drawn from the English system into American law via the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, which
states in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed. .. ."
A jury trial in a criminal case5 follows a set and orderly pat-
tern.' At the end of the trial, after all the evidence and argu-
2. For a thorough description of the study, see infra Part I.
3. For a complete analysis of the results, see infra Part II.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In 1968, the sixth amendment right to a jury trial was
"incorporated" as one of the fourteenth amendment's fundamental liberties and made
applicable to any significant state criminal proceeding. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968). The standards for state and federal trials are not entirely congruent,
however. In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972), for example, the Court con-
cluded that a state law allowing a nonunanimous jury to return a verdict was constitu-
tional. In a federal trial, however, absent a waiver, the Constitution'requires a unani-
mous verdict for a criminal conviction. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring).
The Court has allowed fewer than the usual 12 jurors in state trials, see Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), but has held that a conviction by 5 out of 6 jurors does not
reflect adequately the sense of the community. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
A unanimous five-person jury also fails to satisfy the right to a trial by jury. Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
5. Criminal cases do not ordinarily go to jury trial. Almost 9 out of 10 criminal cases
are disposed of prior to jury determination. Many of the cases are either dismissed dur-
ing pretrial proceedings or result in a guilty plea by the defendant. See Y. KAMISAR, W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21 (7th ed. 1990). Some defendants
also opt for a determination by a judge instead of a jury, in which case no jury instruc-
tions are given. Id. at 19.
6. The petit jury is first impaneled from the larger panel of prospective jurors in a
"voir dire" proceeding, at which either the attorneys or the judge questions the jurors to
uncover any potential bias. See T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 25 (2d
ed. 1988). The attorneys ordinarily make opening statements, although the defense attor-
ney may wait until after the prosecution has presented his entire case. See id. at 51. The
trial itself consists routinely of the following: 1) the prosecutor's direct examination of
her witnesses; 2) the defense counsel's cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses;
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ments have been presented, the judge instructs the jury on the
legal standards that they are to apply.7 The jurors are told that
they are the sole judges of both the facts of the case8 and the
credibility of the witnesses.' Most importantly, they are in-
structed on the elements or constituent parts that the prosecu-
tion must prove for each crime with which the defendant is
charged.10 They also are instructed on the concepts of reasona-
ble doubt and the burden of proof.1
The jury is then sent to the jury room to deliberate without
outside interference. Jury deliberations are not recorded and or-
dinarily postverdict statements or testimony by jury members
may not be used to impeach the verdict" except in those few
instances where it is shown that outside matters improperly in-
fluenced the jury.'3 Judges and attorneys may not contact the
jurors during their deliberations, and" jurors receive very little
help when they are unclear about what is necessary to convict.' 4
Thus, juror comprehension of judicial instructions upon recital
is crucial to a legally correct verdict.
The function of the jury instructions, however, does not stop
with recital of instructions to the jurors and application of in-
3) the prosecutor's redirect and the defense counsel's recross; 4) the repetition of the
same process with the defense counsel now conducting direct examination on his wit-
nesses, and so on. See id. at 151.
7. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 30. Unfortunately, judicial instructions given after the
presentation of evidence come too late to assist jurors in analyzing and processing the
facts of the case. See, e.g., Kassin & Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof: The
Timing of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY Soc. PSY-
CHOLOGY 1877 (1979) (indicating that mock jurors who were given pre-testimony instruc-
tions on the requirements of proof demonstrated a reduced tendency to convict).
8. "[T]he factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State,
[is] to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307, 316 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140,
156 (1979)).
9. "The established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity
of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be
determined by a properly instructed jury." Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311
(1966).
10. "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970).
11. See infra Appendix II.
12. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 1408-10.
13. Id.
14. In fact, judges routinely respond to juror requests to explain instructions by
merely rereading verbatim the same instruction. The judge is not obliged to give all of
the instructions previously given and need only repeat those specifically asked for by the
jury. See People v. Johnson, 167 Mich. App. 168, 175, 421 N.W.2d 617, 620 (1988).
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structions to the perceived facts. Jury instructions in criminal
cases form a basis for legal arguments raised on appellate review
of a criminal conviction.15 Thus, although appellate courts gen-
erally may not review jury determinations, 16 the instructions
that were given to the jury are duly recorded and counsel may
point to errors in the instructions as reason for reversal on ap-
peal. Jury instructions thus form the basis on which the appel-
late courts shape the substantive criminal law. In order to mini-
mize the use of jury instructions as a tool to obtain appellate
reversal, "pattern" or "standard" instructions have been devel-
oped. 17 Perhaps the emphasis placed on technical accuracy ex-
plains why the primary role of jury instructions-to teach jurors
about the law-has arguably been overlooked and under-
represented in the literature and in the cases.1 8 Highly technical
and relatively incompreheisible jury instructions that are legally
15. Appellate courts have been reluctant to reverse convictions following jury trials,
basing their refusals on court rules as well as case law. They ordinarily will not reverse a
conviction even if the jurors did not fully understand the jury instructions. See People v.
Lee, 220 Cal. App. 3d 320, 329, 269 Cal. Rptr. 434, 439 (1990). But see Hoffert v. Florida,
559 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Tucker, 193 Ill. App. 3d 849, 550
N.E.2d 581 (1990).
One barrier to reversing convictions based on poorly comprehended instructions is that
courts will read the instructions "as a whole." City of Minot v. Rubbelke, 456 N.W.2d
511 (N.D. 1990). A concurring judge in People v. Lee commented on this lack of concern
over comprehension:
One juror then noted: "We have read over several pages again and again and we
are having a little bit of difficulty with when specific intent begins." After the
judge stated that he could not further clarify the point, another juror asked:
"How do you find intentions?" The question was not answered .... It is clear
from the above the jurors were having difficulty with the concept of specific in-
tent generally. . . .I am therefore unpersuaded by that too-oft employed bro-
mide that failure to give a correct instruction may be cured by viewing the in-
structions as a whole.
220 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 320, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 434, 439 (White, J., concurring).
A second barrier, derived from court rules, precludes reversal if the defendant did not
object adequately to the jury instructions, unless the alleged error in those instructions
constitutes "plain error" or "fundamental error." See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 569
F.2d 1003, 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978) (finding that even the rejec-
tion by the court of twice-tendered valid instructions did not constitute grounds for re-
versal when the counsel failed to make a distinct objection); State v. Odom, 307 N.C.
655, 661, 300 S.E.2d 375, 379 (1983) (holding that, in applying the "plain error" test, the
reviewing court "must examine the entire record and determine if the instructional error
had a probable impact on the jury's finding of guilt").
16. Appellate courts may review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a convic-
tion by guilty verdict, but they may not substitute their own interpretation of the evi-
dence for the jury's interpretation. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-20
(1979).
17. See Koenig, Kerr & Van Hoek, Michigan Standard Criminal Jury Instructions:
Judges' Perspectives After Ten Years' Use, 4 COOLEY L. REv. 347, 361 (1987).
18. Some authors, however, have recognized the importance of comprehensible jury
instructions. For a thorough discussion regarding comprehensible jury instructions and
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"correct" but less than useful in practice have supported guilty
verdicts on appeal."9 No matter how technically accurate an in-
struction is, it fails in its primary purpose if jurors are unable to
use it to deliberate and determine verdicts.
In response to this concern, the Juror Comprehension Project
("the Project") sought to determine whether jurors understand
judicial instructions. This Article reports the results of an em-
pirical study growing out of that Project. The Project investi-
gated how well 600 actual jurors in Michigan understood crimi-
nal jury instructions in actual trials. Part I describes the history
of the study and explains the procedures and materials used in
the study. Part II presents the results of the study, first analyz-
ing juror comprehension of selected concepts, then discussing
general factors that influence juror comprehension. Part III con-
cludes that the results show a mixed juror understanding of
complex judicial instructions, discusses this mixed understand-
ing, and argues for changes in the current method of jury in-
struction, including the use of written instructions and simpler
language.
I. THE STUDY
The study undertaken by the Juror Comprehension Project is
the result of a collaboration between social science researchers
from Michigan State University and legal professionals-judges,
prosecutors and defense attorneys who were members of the
Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions Committee (the "CJI Com-
mittee" or the "Committee").2 °
an alternative method of evaluation, see A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY
INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982).
19. Some of the most confusing instructions have been in the terms of art found in
homicide law. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 423 Mich. 261, 292-303, 378 N.W.2d 365, 375-84
(1985) (Levin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that trial judge
gave incorrect felony-murder instruction, telling the jury that it might infer from defend-
ant's participation in robbery that he had the requisite intent to support a conviction for
murder); People v. Borgetto, 99 Mich. 336, 339, 58 N.W. 328, 329 (1894) (holding unob-
jectionable a jury instruction that stated that malice includes "not only anger, hatred
and revenge but every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive"). The arguments against
such language are discussed in People v. Morrin, 31 Mich. App. 301, 310-24, 187 N.W.2d
434, 438-46 (1971). See also Koenig, Jury Instructions for Jurors: Proposals for the Sim-
plification of Michigan Instructions on Murder, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1974); Purver,
The Language of Murder, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1306, 1308-10 (1967).
For a case other than homicide, see People v. White, 168 Mich. App. 596, 604-06, 425
N.W.2d 193, 197-98 (1988) (upholding jury instruction as to whether defendant was
armed with a weapon).
20. Koenig, Kerr & Van Hoek, supra note 17, at 347-49.
SPRING 1990]
Journal of Law Reform
The collaboration began with a 1987 survey of Michigan
judges. The 1987 survey helped identify perceived weaknesses in
Michigan's standard criminal jury instructions, because judges
giving instructions in criminal cases are in the best position to
recognize difficulties that jurors might encounter.2 Based on the
results of the 1987 survey, certain instructions were targeted as
likely candidates for juror confusion.
A. Overview of the Study
Once the 1987 survey identified potentially problematic in-
structions, the Project developed a short, easy-to-complete ques-
tionnaire. This questionnaire consisted of both true-false and
open-ended questions. 22 Actual jurors received this question-
naire immediately after they finished serving on a trial. The
Project assessed juror comprehension of instructions by compar-
ing the responses of jurors instructed on a particular standard
with jurors who had not received such an instruction. The pre-
sumption, of course, was that jurors exposed to instructions
would score higher than the jurors not exposed.
This procedure yielded a great deal of data about the compre-
hension level of ordinary jurors. It also tested comprehension
following actual trials and did so without interfering with appel-
late review of the instructions. Finally, it demonstrated that so-
cial science researchers and' legal experts can work together pro-
ductively to test empirically the effectiveness of jury
instructions.
B. The Questionnaire
Each true-false question was intended to test comprehension
of one jury instruction or one aspect of an instruction. The
open-ended questions, which were designed to probe for addi-
tional sources of misunderstanding about jury instructions, al-
lowed jurors to report their thoughts and experiences in trying
to comprehend and use instructions.
The items contained in the questionnaire were developed in
the following manner. First, Dorean Koenig, Geoffrey Kramer
and Norbert Kerr wrote approximately seventy-five true-false
21. Id. at 369-71.
22. For a copy of the questionnaire, see infra Appendix I.
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questions and submitted them to the CJI Committee for review
by committee members. The committee members scrutinized
these questions for legal accuracy and clarity. They recom-
mended keeping or discarding each item, suggested rewording,
commented about possible misinterpretations, and suggested al-
ternate questions. Committee members also indicated whether
the question, as worded, was true or false. Their responses for
each question were tabulated and compared. The Committee
only retained questions for which there was unanimity about a
correct answer and for which there was a clear consensus on the
question's relationship to the targeted instruction. The remain-
ing questions were revised by the Committee, and this procedure
was repeated with members of the Juror Comprehension Sub-
committee of the CJI Committee, as well as a member of the
Plain English Committee of the Michigan State Bar. The CJI
Committee made every effort to word the questions in simple
language. The questionnaire was again submitted to the CJI
Committee for feedback and final approval.
The complexity of the items on the questionnaire varies con-
siderably. This variation was intended for two reasons. First, it
reflects a reality about jury instructions themselves. Some in-
structions seem straightforward while others engender consider-
able debate, even among legal professionals.23 Second, it reflects
the differing abilities of the jurors.
Some instructions are confusing because the underlying legal
standards are vague and indefinite. This is indicative of an un-
willingness in the law to refine difficult questions that produce
substantial differences of opinion among lawyers and judges."' It
is easier to leave technical and expansive jury instructions in a
form that may be incomprehensible to the layperson because le-
gal terminology is not ordinarily a ground for reversal of a con-
viction.15 In other words, because juror confusion is not ordi-
narily grounds for reversal as long as the underlying instructions
are technically correct, our legal system provides little incentive
to correct errors in juror comprehension. Obviously, if jurors
cannot ascertain what the law requires, their decisions will be
23. For an example, see the discussion of reasonable doubt, infra notes 45-56 and
accompanying text.
24. See Koenig, Kerr & Van Hoek, supra note 17, at 354-55 (giving an example of
judges' disagreement over "reasonable doubt"). Koenig, Kerr, and Van Hoek also discuss
the history of the "reasonable doubt" instruction in Michigan, id. at 356-58, and summa-
rize the four different methods used in the United States to explain the concept of rea-
sonable doubt to juries, id. at 372-73.
25. See id. at 362.
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tainted. Under our present 'system, however, there is no method
to redress this confusion.
In addition, as a matter of test construction, it is desirable to
include items that vary in difficulty.2" A questionnaire with uni-
formly easy items probably would do little to assess jurors' com-
prehension of more difficult aspects of instructions, while uni-
formly difficult items might differentiate comprehension levels
among only the brightest jurors. Variability in the difficulty of
items, however, might reveal whether jurors comprehended the
basic meaning of the instructions as well as their more subtle
distinctions.
C., Procedure
Before using the questionnaire in earnest, we conducted a pi-
lot test of it on undergradiiate students in a jury simulation and
on a small sample of actualjurors following trials. We hoped to
identify questions that might present unforeseen problems. For
instance, if virtually all jurors in the pilot sample answered a
question correctly, further testing with that question pr6bably
would be uninformative. In that case, we would replace the
question with another that-might better reveal possible sources
of juror misunderstanding.. In addition, we conducted follow-up
interviews with student pilot subjects to reveal unforeseen ambi-
guities in the wording of the questions. We made minor revisions
as a result of this testing.
The first task in administering the questionnaire to actual ju-
rors was to secure the cooperation of a number of courts. The
Project contacted several judges from the Detroit Recorder's
Court and the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit Court of Lansing, Mich-
igan. These courts were selected because they hear a relatively
high number of cases, which facilitated data collection. Specific
judges were contacted in. order to achieve a balance between
judges who had defense-orientated backgrounds and judges who
26. The desirability of varying the difficulty of items in a test depends upon the pur-
pose for which the test is given. Variability in item difficulties for our questionnaire was
desirable because jurors' abilities were likely to vary broadly. Further, our purpose was
to assess whether jurors understood both the elementary and complex aspects of particu-
lar instructions. Therefore, questions that varied in difficulty were constructed. It is
worth noting that the overall test difficulty was very close to 50% (i.e., half of the items
answered correctly), though the range of individual item difficulty varied roughly from
25% to 95% for uninstructed jurors. For a discussion of the relationship between test
item difficulty and testing purposes, see A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 205-06 (4th
ed. 1976). See also J. NUNNALLY, EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION 133 (1964).
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had prosecution-oriented backgrounds. Only those judges who
routinely used the Criminal Jury Instructions verbatim partici-
pated. A total of twelve different courts eventually provided
data, seven from Detroit and five from Lansing.
The Project administered the questionnaire to actual jurors
immediately after they finished serving on a trial. Juror partici-
pation was entirely voluntary. At the completion of a trial, either
the trial judge or the court clerk explained briefly the purpose of
the questionnaire and requested that jurors complete it individ-
ually and at their own pace. The court exercised its discretion as
to whether the judge or a court clerk administered the question-
naire and explained its purpose. Not surprisingly, higher per-
centages of jurors volunteered in the courts in which the judge
administered and explained the questionnaire.2" Completed
questionnaires were collected and mailed to Michigan State Uni-
versity for analysis. A checklist, filled out by the court clerk, ac-
companied the questionnaires from. each jury, indicating which
criminal jury instructions those jurors had heard.
D. Design
The study focused on a comparison between instructed and
uninstructed jurors. The instructed jurors were those who had
been exposed to targeted instructions during the trial. The unin-
structed (control) jurors were those who were not exposed to
targeted instructions. Because all jurors were requested to an-
swer every question on the questionnaire, each juror could func-
tion as an instructed juror for some questions and an unin-
structed juror for other questions.: For example, jurors who
served on a felony murder case heard instructions about felony
murder, but not about assault."' They served as instructed jurors
for questions dealing with felony murder and uninstructed ju-
rors for questions dealing with assault.29 Persons who did not
27. The Lansing courts also requested that jurors complete a different, internal ques-
tionnaire. This additional request may have reduced participation in these courts.
28. Assault is not a felony that will support a conviction for felony murder in Michi-
gan. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (West 1968 & Supp. 1989).
29. Unfortunately, we do not have any data comparing control jurors who never
served with control jurors who served but were not exposed to particular instructions. It
seems reasonable to suppose that the two groups are comparable in their responses to
questions for which they did not hear instructions. Jurors who did serve were initially
selected from the same pool as those jurors who did not serve, all jurors being selected
via a random process, so there should be no systematic differences between the groups. It
is also difficult to specify how exposure to some instructions (e.g., reasonable doubt, as-
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serve on a jury comprised the control group for questions con-
cerning reasonable doubt and witness credibility because reason-
able doubt and witness credibility instructions are given to all
jurors who serve in a criminal trial.3 0 The rates of comprehen-
sion for uninstructed jurors, as revealed by the number of cor-
rect and incorrect responses, served as a baseline to evaluate the
comprehension of instructed jurors and to make inferences
about the effects of the instructions.
E. The Sample of Jurors
In total, 882 jurors, including those who served on a trial and
control jurors who did not serve, were asked to complete the
questionnaire. Of those requested, 600 completed the question-
naire, resulting in a compliance rate of approximately 68%. For
the sample that completed questionnaires, the gender distribu-
tion was 50.2% female and 49.8% male. They ranged in age
from 19 to 71, with a mean age of 39 and a median age of 37.
Their educational level ranged from 7 to 20 or more years of
education, with a mean of 13.4 years and a median of 12 years of
education.
Testing actual jurors following actual trials has the advantage
of realism, but it also presents certain limitations. Primary
among these is the lack of control over a variety of factors that
might influence juror comprehension. For instance, jurors who
volunteer to take a questionnaire may be brighter and generally
may have higher rates of comprehension than jurors who do not
volunteer. This possibility does not have strong support. Of ju-
ries that returned questionnaires, 60% had all twelve members
complete a questionnaire, and 75% had at least eleven of twelve
members complete the questionnaire. Thus, self-selection within
juries was relatively uncommon-either virtually all jurors from
a jury completed the questionnaire or few or none did. Also, dis-
cussion of jury instructions may occur during deliberation, im-
sault, etc.) would influence responses to questions concerning instructions to which a
juror had never been exposed (e.g., the elements of first degree felony murder). Still, it is
possible that jurors who were instructed on some points of law during trials made infer-
ences about other points of law that jurors who were never instructed at all did not
make. Ultimately, this is an empirical question.
30. Certain instructions are given to all or nearly all juries (e.g., reasonable doubt).
For those instructions, the uninstructed comparison group was a sample of jurors who
were called to jury duty but who never actually served because of a surplus of potential
jurors or last-minute settlements. These persons were asked to complete the question-
naire once it was clear that they would not be needed by the court.
[VOL. 23:3
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proving the comprehension of jurors who initially did not under-
stand an instruction. It is therefore difficult to make strong
assertions about juror comprehension before deliberation, based
on the results of a questionnaire administered after deliberation.
One would hope that deliberation improves comprehension of
instructions, but postdeliberation testing of juror comprehension
may not provide an unambiguously clear picture of how compre-
hensible certain instructions are when they are given. Some of
the limitations of testing actual jurors could be controlled by our
procedures, but other limitations could not.
3 '
An important question is whether our volunteer sample re-
flects a truly random sample of jurors. Neither the Detroit nor
the Lansing courts keep records of juror demographics, so no di-
rect comparison with their jury pools can be made. A sample of
205 jurors chosen at random over a 16-month period from the
Lansing courts does provide a basis for comparison. 2 This ran-
dom sample had a mean education level of 13.3 years, 3  nearly
identical to the 13.4 mean for the volunteer sample. The mean
age for that randomly chosen sample was 39.3,34 again very close
to the 39.0 mean age for the volunteer sample. Finally, the pro-
portion of men and women in our volunteer sample does not dif-
fer significantly from the proportion in the general population.36
We believe our volunteer sample, therefore, is representative of
a random sample of jurors drawn from a metropolitan area in
Michigan."6
The variation in volunteer rate was mostly a function of the
courts from which the jurors came. Jurors frequently declined in
some courts, while in other courts very few or no jurors declined.
Follow-up telephone interviews with the personnel who adminis-
tered the questionnaires revealed that declining was primarily
related to who made the request. There was much greater com-
31. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
32. A comparison with one relevant population would be ideal. Unfortunately, such a
population does not appear to be available. We could find no statewide demographics for
jurors (which is not surprising because neither Detroit nor Lansing keep such records).
Therefore, we used the sample from a study by Kramer, Kerr, and Carroll for compari-
son. See Kramer, Kerr & Carroll, Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias,
14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. - (forthcoming 1990) (draft on file at the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Michigan's population is 51.3% female and 48.7% male. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 2 (1988).
36. The educational level of persons from Lansing is slightly higher than the educa-
tional level of persons from Detroit. Id. at 668. Thus, our volunteer sample might slightly
overestimate the average education level of Detroit's juror pool.
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pliance among Detroit Recorder's Court jurors, where judges
typically made the request, than among Lansing Circuit Court
jurors, where clerks typically made the request. In a few in-
stances, court personnel indicated that declining also may have
been related to time of day, with more jurors declining in the
late afternoon after long deliberations. No one reported that de-
clining seemed obviously related to juror characteristics such as
helpfulness, age, intelligence, or reading ability.
II. RESULTS OF THE STUDY: JUROR COMPREHENSION OF
INDIVIDUAL INSTRUCTIONS
To examine the effect of each instruction, the Juror Compre-
hension Project analyzed every question by comparing average
percentage correct obtained by uninstructed jurors with average
percentage correct obtained by instructed jurors. Only jurors
who had heard the relevant instruction verbatim were included
in the instructed group. Next, an analysis was undertaken that
subdivided the uninstructed and instructed groups into into
high and low education categories.17 Such an analysis might re-
veal cases in which jurors at one education level were more (or
less) influenced by instructions than jurors at another education
level.
A few comments about interpretation should precede the ana-
lysis of specific results. First, because the questions are in a true-
false format, mere guessing should result in a 50% correct re-
sponse rate. Scores significantly above that level reflect at least
some understanding of the concept tested. Scores significantly
below 50% are more difficult to interpret, but probably indicate
the presence of misconceptions-in other words, a belief that the
wrong answer is correct rather than an absence of knowl-
edge-or a problem with the question itself. This is important
because scores for some of the questions are considerably below
50%. Second, differences among groups that have large sample
sizes are more reliable than differences among groups that have
small sample sizes.38
In the results reported below, questions are grouped and re-
ported by topic area; for example, all questions concerned with
reasonable doubt are listed under that heading. The Criminal
37. The groups were split at the median, resulting in one group with 12 or fewer
years of education and one group with 13 or more years of education.
38. See J. HEALEY, STATISTICS 125-26 (1984).
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Jury Instruction number(s) that apply to the relevant topic are
in parentheses accompanying each question. Each question is
then listed. Underneath each question appear the results for
that question. An analysis of variance was performed on each
question." Results are presented in the following format:
Topic Area (Criminal Jury Instruction number(s))
Uninstructed = A% Instructed = B% A p
(number uninstructed) (number instructed)
A% the percentage correct for uninstructed jurors, which serves as a base-
line of comprehension for that particular question (group sample sizes
appear below the percentage, in parentheses);
B% = the percentage correct for instructed jurors (group sample sizes ap-
pear below the percentage, in parentheses);
A = the change resulting from instruction; and
p = the statistical significance of the difference, which refers to the statis-
tical probability that the observed difference would have occurred by
chance alone. This statistic helps interpret the difference (A) between
groups. As the p value increases, the likelihood that the observed dif-
ference has resulted from chance increases. For example, a p value of
.3 indicates that there is a 3 in 10 chance that the observed difference
is caused by chance or sampling error; a .5 indicates that there is a 5
in 10 chance that the observed difference is a result of chance. Con-
versely, smaller p values imply that the difference is unlikely to be
caused by chance and more likely to be caused by the instructions.
Social scientists have traditionally accepted a p value of less than .05
as statistically significant.'" Values greater than .05 are generally con-
sidered nonsignificant. Thus, in judging whether an observed differ-
ence may be produced by an instruction rather than by chance, one
should consider not only the size of the observed difference, but also
the significance level.
A brief discussion of the results follows each series of ques-
tions. It should be reiterated that the instructions tested by this
procedure were those identified as most problematic. The
study's results, therefore, should not be used to draw overly gen-
eralized conclusions regarding juror comprehension of
instructions.
39. Analysis of variance is a statistical test that allows one to infer whether an ob-
served difference between groups is the result of random chance or the reliable result of
some systematic difference in the way that the two groups were treated. In this case, the
systematic difference is, of course, exposure versus no exposure to selected instructions.
40. See R. WONNACOTr & T. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 261 (4th ed.
1985).
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A. Reasonable Doubt (03:1:04 or 03:1:05)
1. A REASONABLE DOUBT IS BASED ON YOUR COMMON SENSE.
[TRUE]
Uninstructed = 68.8% Instructed = 84.6% A = 15.8 p = .005
(48) (526)
10. A REASONABLE DOUBT MUST BE BASED ONLY ON THE EVIDENCE
THAT WAS PRESENTED IN THE COURTROOM, NOT ON ANY CON-
CLUSION THAT YOU DRAW FROM THE EVIDENCE. [FALSE]
Uninstructed = 48.0% Instructed = 31.8% A = -16.2 p = .020
(50) (510)
4. YOU HAVE A REASONABLE DOUBT IF YOU CAN SEE ANY POSSIBIL-
ITY, NO MATTER HOW SLIGHT, THAT THE DEFENDANT IS INNO-
CENT. IF SO, YOU SHOULD FIND THE DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY.
[FALSE]
Uninstructed = 24.0% Instructed = 25.2% A = 1.2 p = .853
(48) (514)
22. To FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT, YOU MUST BE 100% CERTAIN OF THE DEFENDANT'S
GUILT. [FALSE]
Uninstructed = 26.5% Instructed = 30.9% A = 4.4 p .528
(49) (505)
Approximately 69% of uninstructed jurors believe that they
are allowed to use their common sense to judge whether a rea-
sonable doubt exists. The reasonable doubt instruction in either
of the two forms increases this to approximately 85%. The
amount of increase as a result of exposure to the instruction is
identical for both high and low education groups.
Some confusion seems to exist, however, between reasonable
doubt and any doubt. A majority of responses from uninstructed
jurors revealed a belief that any doubt (or, alternately, anything
less than 100% certainty) is equivalent to a reasonable doubt.
Reasonable doubt instructions apparently did little to improve
jurors' understanding that absolute certainty is not required."'
Question 10 suggests misunderstanding about whether jurors
are allowed to draw inferences or conclusions from the evidence
in order to reach a verdict. The comprehension rate actually de-
41. The high p values for questions 4 and 22 on reasonable doubt indicate that the
observed difference between uninstructed and instructed jurors is likely the result of
chance factors, such as random sampling error, and that the comprehension of the two
groups of jurors do not differ in reality. Interestingly, uninstructed jurors with high edu-
cation showed the most misunderstanding of all, responding correctly at a rate of 17%.
Receiving instructions raised the high education group's correct response rate to only
31%.
[VOL. 23:3
Michigan Juror Comprehension Project
clined as a result of exposure to instruction, though it is difficult
to know if this effect comes from exposure to the instruction or
from other factors that might be associated with reasonable
doubt, such as repetition of the standard or conflict with other
instructions.
The responses to questions 4 and 22 reflect a poor under-
standing of the reasonable doubt standard. Perhaps the ques-
tions did not test the information given in the instructions. De-
spite having been approved both by legal experts and by social
scientists, the questions may differ importantly from the corre-
sponding instructions. Questions 4 and 22 attempt to ask jurors
about reasonable doubt as a quantifiable concept: question 4
speaks of "any doubt, no matter how slight," and question 22
speaks of "100% certain[ty]." The reasonable doubt instruc-
tions, on the other hand, are not cast in quantitative language
but instead ask the jurors to examine the evidence qualita-
tively.42 Jurors are instructed that a reasonable doubt is one that
would cause them to hesitate in making an important decision in
their own life, and that the decision is a moral one.4 3 An alterna-
tive instruction also states that the evidence must convince them
to a moral certainty of the defendant's guilt before they vote to
convict.44 Thus, the instructions given may have emphasized one
concept while the questions presented may have asked some-
thing different-an apples and oranges situation. As stated by
Professor Nesson:
As long as the concept [of reasonable doubt] is left am-
biguous, members of the observing public may assume
that they share with jury members common notions of
the kinds and degree of doubt that are unaccept-
able. . . . The closer reasonable doubt comes to quantifi-
cation, the more any notion of it being a shared concept
will break down.46
Indeed, some instructions that have attempted to define reason-
able doubt in quantifiable terms have been declared reversible
error.46 Whether these questions test the true meaning of rea-
42. For a copy of the jury instructions on reasonable doubt see infra Appendix II.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1196-97 (1979).
46. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 802, 804, 482 N.E.2d
1198, 1199 (1985) (reversing when jury instructions stated: "[fil you put it in a one to
hundred scale? I don't know. It's above fifty percent."); McCullough v. State, 99 Nev. 72,
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sonable doubt is certainly debatable. Perhaps questions that ad-
dressed more qualitative distinctions would have been more in-
formative, even though these questions are difficult to formulate
because of the inherent ambiguity of reasonable doubt. Never-
theless, the minimal and even negative effects of these instruc-
tions should raise serious concern about whether instructed ju-
rors understand a crucial element of their charge-the meaning
of reasonable doubt.
B. Witness Credibility (3:1:11)
15. IN DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS, YOU MAY CON-
SIDER NOT ONLY WHAT THE WITNESS SAID, BUT HOW HE OR SHE
SAID IT. [TRUE]
Uninstructed = 91.7% Instructed = 84.1% A = -7.3 p = .121
(60) (496)
18. IF A WITNESS IS HONEST AND CONFIDENT, YOU CAN BE CERTAIN
THAT HE OR SHE IS ACCURATE IN THEIR [SIC] PERCEPTION OF
EVENTS. [FALSE]
Uninstructed = 77.6% Instructed = 69.0% A = -8.6 p = .181
(58) (442)
28. IT IS THE JUROR'S RESPONSIBILITY TO DECIDE IF THE WITNESSES
ARE TRUTHFUL, NOT THE JUDGE'S OR THE ATTORNEY'S. [TRUE]'
4
Uninstructed = 85.0% Instructed = 92.0% A = 7 p = .220
(77) (47)
Two things are apparent when one examines the responses to
questions dealing with witness credibility. The first is that com-
prehension levels are generally high, and the second is that com-
prehension levels appear to decrease as a result of instruction.
The latter result is puzzling.
74, 657 P.2d 1157, 1157 (1983) (reversing where the judge instructed "seven and a half,
[on a scale of 0-10] if you had to put it on a scale"). But see Kagehiro & Stanton, Legal
v. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1985).
Some famous cases discussing reasonable doubt indicate that some of the best judges
throughout history have experienced difficulty defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Compare Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295 (1850) (Shaw, C.J.) (providing a tech-
nical definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt) with People v. Brigham, 25 Cal. 3d
283, 292, 599 P.2d 100, 106 (1979) (Mosk, J. concurring) (criticizing Chief Justice Shaw's
definition from Webster as confusing, and concluding that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not susceptible to a technical definition).
47. Questions 28-31 were omitted from the questionnaire given to most jurors after a
preliminary analysis because both uninstructed and instructed jurors' understanding of
these concepts was quite high.
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One possible explanation is that the reduced comprehension
for the instructed jurors is more apparent than real. Generally,
social scientists regard significance levels above .05 as suspi-
cious.4 8 Because values for both questions 15 and 18 are above
that level, it might be that comprehension for the instructed and
uninstructed groups are actually the same and appear to differ
only because of random sampling variation. If there is an actual
difference between the groups such that instructed jurors com-
prehend less, two explanations may be advanced.
First, judicial instructions regarding witness credibility may
actually mislead jurors. For instance, the results of question 15
are consistent with the results of question 22, which concerned
reasonable doubt, in that both show instructed jurors endorsing
the idea that they are not allowed to draw inferences. It may be
that the instructions themselves lead jurors to endorse this idea.
Second, it may be that the repetition of standards stressing
the presumption of innocence and proper use of evidence leads
jurors to conclude that the law requires them to "stick to the
facts" and not draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Why
comprehension might decrease for instructed jurors in question
18 is less clear, particularly because in this question jurors seem
to believe that they are allowed to draw inferences about credi-
bility from paralinguistic cues.
In any event, the possibility that jurors are misled by the in-
struction or that the sum total of instructions causes jurors to
believe the court requires an overly restrictive standard for
drawing inferences is speculative. It cannot be determined con-
clusively from the present results. The most parsimonious con-
clusion is that the observed differences resulted from chance
rather than that they represent reliable indicia of lower compre-
hension by the instructed group. Particularly for question 18, for
which the p value of nearly .2 is far above what is traditionally
regarded as indicating a reliable difference, 'this conclusion
seems warranted.
C. Mixed Direct and Circumstantial Evidence (4:2:02)
5. FACTS CAN BE PROVEN THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
[TRUE]
Uninstructed 53.9% Instructed = 64.8% A = 10.9 p = .008
(290) (219)
48. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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9. SUPPOSE YOU SEE THAT YOUR NEIGHBOR'S DRAPES ARE CLOSED.
WHEN YOU LOOK A MINUTE LATER, YOU SEE THE DRAPES OPEN
AND THE LIGHTS ON. THE CONCLUSION THAT SOMEONE IS AT
HOME WOULD BE BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. [TRUE]
Uninstructed = 81.4% Instructed = 86.7% A = 5.3 p = .113
(291) (218)
16. A WITNESS'S STATEMENT THAT HE OR SHE SAW SOMETHING IS
AN EXAMPLE OF DIRECT EVIDENCE. [TRUE]
Uninstructed = 74.8% Instructed = 75.4% A = .6 p = .893
(278) (215)
23. SUPPOSE THAT A WITNESS SAW THE DEFENDANT'S AUTOMOBILE
PARKED NEAR THE SCENE OF A CRIME. THE CONCLUSION THAT
THE DEFENDANT WAS IN THE AREA WOULD BE BASED UPON DI-
RECT EVIDENCE. [FALSE]
Uninstructed = 59.0% Instructed = 61.2% A = 2.2 p = .644
(244) (206)
19. THE PROSECUTOR MAY NOT BUILD A CASE ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE ALONE. [FALSE]
Uninstructed = 32.1% Instructed = 37.6% A = 5.2 p = .211
(280) (213)
The results from questions 5 and 19 suggest that uninstructed
jurors believe that circumstantial evidence may be worthless.
The instruction effectively communicates that circumstantial
evidence can have value.
Although of marginal statistical significance, responses to
question 9 suggest that instruction probably helps jurors distin-
guish between direct and circumstantial evidence only mini-
mally. The factor that primarily determines a juror's ability to
make this distinction is the juror's education level. Averaging
across all three questions, uninstructed jurors with less educa-
tion were 67% correct. Uninstructed jurors with more education
averaged 78% correct. The instructions improved the perform-
ance of both groups by only about 3%.
The results from question 19, which is less tied to the wording
of 4:2:02, suggest a belief by jurors that prosecutors must have
more than circumstantial evidence. This is probably consistent
with jurors' general belief that evidence must be quite strong as
reflected in their responses to questions concerning reasonable
doubt. Even for the high-education instructed group, the 54%
correct response rate could have resulted from mere guessing.
[VOL. 23:3
Michigan Juror Comprehension Project
D. Impeachment of Defendant by Prior Conviction (3:1:08)
7. YOU CAN NOT CONSIDER A DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIMINAL CON-
VICTIONS FOR ANY PURPOSE. [FALSE]
Uninstructed = 28.2% Instructed = 56.3% A = 28.1 p = .015
(539) (16)
25. YOU CAN CONSIDER A DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVIC-
TIONS IN DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE THE DEFENDANT'S
TESTIMONY. [TRUE]
Uninstructed = 26.2% Instructed = 50.0% A = 23.8 p = .035
(511) (16)
12. SUPPOSE YOU LEARN THAT A DEFENDANT HAS SEVERAL PRIOR
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS. BASED ON THIS FACT, YOU CAN ASSUME
THAT THERE IS A GREATER CHANCE THAT THE DEFENDANT IS
GUILTY OF THE CRIME WHICH HE IS NOW CHARGED WITH.
[FALSE]
Uninstructed = 79.6% Instructed = 75.0% A = -4.6 p = .645
(539) (16)
Taken together, the results of these questions suggest that
uninstructed jurors commonly believe that a defendant's prior
record should not be used for any purpose. Roughly three out of
four uninstructed jurors endorsed this view. The 23% and 28%
increases in correct responses to questions 7 and 25, respectively,
suggest that instruction may have reduced this misunderstand-
ing. These increases, however, were only enough to raise correct
responses to a level that could have resulted from mere guessing.
The results for questions 7 and 25 were independent of educa-
tional level.
Question 12 indicates that most uninstructed jurors believe
correctly that they should not use a defendant's prior convic-
tions to imply an increased probability of guilt for the current
offense. This conforms with the. general "should not use" heuris-
tic that most uninstructed jurors seem to employ when consider-
ing a defendant's prior record. When education level was ac-
counted for, uninstructed persons with more education were
correct more often and benefitted more from instruction. Re-
sponses improved from 84% to 100% correct. Persons with less
education did not benefit from instruction, and in fact showed a
decrease that was marginally significant.
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E. Homicide (16:2:01, 16:2:02, 16:3:01, 16:3:02, 16:4:01, 16:4:02,
16:4:03)
i. First degree premeditated murder
24. FOR FIRST DEGREE PREMEDITATED MURDER, IT DOESN'T MAT-
TER WHETHER THE DEFENDANT INTENDED TO KILL THE VICTIM.
IF THE VICTIM WAS KILLED BY THE DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS, THAT
IS ENOUGH. [FALSE] (16:2:01)
Uninstructed = 63.6% Instructed = 65.8% A = 2.2 p = .665
(418) (117)
21. SUPPOSE A DEFENDANT WAS STRONGLY PROVOKED BY A VICTIM,
BUT KILLED THE VICTIM LATER, AFTER HE COOLED DOWN. THE
MOST SERIOUS OFFENSE YOU CAN CONVICT THE DEFENDANT ON
IS MANSLAUGHTER. [FALSE] (16:2:01, 16:4:02)
Uninstructed = 75.6% Instructed = 80.3% A - 4.7 p = .288
(427) (117)
3. ACTUAL INTENT TO KILL OR CREATE A VERY HIGH RISK OF DEATH
IS REQUIRED FOR BOTH FIRST DEGREE PREMEDITATED MURDER
AND VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. [FALSE] (16:2:01, 16:4:02)"'
Uninstructed = N/A Instructed = N/A A = N/A p = N/A
(N/A) (N/A)
Roughly two out of three jurors answered correctly that intent
is required for first degree murder. For more-educated jurors,
the figure is closer to three out of four. This comprehension level
is not impressive, considering that intent is a crucial aspect of
first degree premeditated murder. The instructions did not im-
prove substantially the comprehension for either lbw- or high-
education jurors.
Question 21 indicates that three out of four uninstructed ju-
rors answered correctly that if a defendant reflected on the kill-
ing, the defendant could be convicted of a crime more serious
than manslaughter. Again, uninstructed jurors with more educa-
tion grasp this concept quite well (85%). Instruction had a mini-
mal impact on the small percentage of people who did not al-
ready understand the effect of reflection.
ii. First degree felony murder
6. SUPPOSE THAT A DEFENDANT WAS ROBBING A GAS STATION. HE
HAD NOT PLANNED TO HURT ANYONE, BUT HE GOT SCARED BE-
CAUSE HE THOUGHT THAT THE ATTENDANT WAS REACHING FOR A
GUN. HE SHOT AND KILLED THE ATTENDANT. YOU CAN STILL
49. Jurors received two different versions of question 3. We thus cannot draw reliable
conclusions from this question.
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CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF FIRST DEGREE FELONY MURDER.
[TRUE] (16:2:02)
Uninstructed = 63.4% Instructed = 74.0% A = 10.6 p = .037
(431) (89)
Question 6 attempted to test comprehension of first degree
felony murder by asking jurors to identify an example. Again,
roughly two out of three jurors succeeded. Surprisingly, this
time the uninstructed jurors with less education were more often
correct (73% versus 52%). For the less-educated group, the in-
struction had no effect; for the more-educated group, the in-
struction had a large effect (from 52% to 72%). Thus, this in-
struction raised the comprehension level of the more-educated
group to roughly 75%, which corresponds with the comprehen-
sion level of the less-educated group.
iii. Second degree murder; second degree murder as a lesser
included offense
2. To BE CONVICTED OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER, THE DEFENDANT
MUST HAVE PREMEDITATED A KILLING; THAT IS, HE OR SHE HAD
TO PLAN IT OUT BEFOREHAND. [FALSE] (16:3:01, 16:3:02)
Uninstructed = 71.5% Instructed = 83.5% A = 12 p = .007
(425) (127)
Question 2 tests jurors' understanding of a critical difference
between first and second degree murder: premeditation. Each
instruction produced a substantial improvement in comprehen-
sion for both less-educated jurors, who rose to 76% after instruc-
tion, and more-educated jurors, who rose to 92% after
instruction.
iv. Voluntary manslaughter; voluntary manslaughter as a
lesser included offense
26. To BE CONVICTED OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, A DEFEN-
DANT MUST HAVE KILLED WHILE INFLUENCED BY CIRCUM-
STANCES THAT NORMALLY WOULD PRODUCE STRONG FEELINGS
OR PASSION. THE KILLING MUST HAVE OCCURRED BEFORE A
NORMAL PERSON WOULD HAVE :HAD TIME TO STOP AND THINK
ABOUT WHAT HE WAS ABOUT TO' DO. [TRUE] (16:4:01, 16:4:02)
Uninstructed = 67.6% Instructed = 89.3% A = 21.7 p = .001
(414) (56)
27. SUPPOSE THAT A DEFENDANT WAS GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND
CARELESS IN HIS ACTIONS. HIS ACTIONS CAUSED SOMEONE'S
DEATH. THOUGH THE DEATH WAS AN ACCIDENT AND NOT AT ALL
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INTENDED, YOU CAN FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF INVOLUN-
TARY MANSLAUGHTER. [TRUE] (16:4:03)50
Uninstructed = 87.7% Instructed = 75.0% A = 12.7 p = N/A
(515) (4)
Question 26 tests jurors' recognition that voluntary man-
slaughter requires emotional arousal and an absence of premedi-
tation. Though the majority of uninstructed jurors knew this,
the instruction appeared highly effective in assisting those who
did not. Again, the more-educated group scored higher than the
less-educated group, but the instruction improved comprehen-
sion for both groups significantly.
F. Attempt as a Lesser Included Offense (9:1:02)
14. EVIDENCE THAT A DEFENDANT MADE DEFINITE PLANS TO COM-
MIT A CRIME IS ENOUGH TO PROVE THAT HE ATTEMPTED IT.
[FALSE]
Uninstructed = 66.6% Instructed - 100% A = 33.4 p = N/A
(554) (4)
17. SUPPOSE THAT A DEFENDANT HAD PLANNED A ROBBERY OR
CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT (RAPE). HE THEN BEGAN TO COM-
MIT THE CRIME. HOWEVER, HE WAS INTERRUPTED AND PRE-
VENTED FROM COMPLETING THE CRIME. YOU CAN STILL FIND
HIM GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED ROBBERY OR ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL
SEXUAL CONDUCT. [TRUE]
Uninstructed = 93.0% Instructed = 100% A = 7 p = N/A
(558) (4)
Unfortunately, only four persons from one jury were exposed
to this instruction and completed a questionnaire. Though the
direction of the effect is encouraging and the comprehension of
uninstructed jurors appears high, the sampling error from such a
small group is likely to render a comparison of instructed versus
uninstructed groups statistically insignificant.
G. Specific Intent (3:1:16)
8. SPECIFIC INTENT MEANS THAT A DEFENDANT HAD PLANNED TO DO
AT LEAST SOMETHING ILLEGAL, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HE HAD
PLANNED TO COMMIT THE CRIME HE IS CHARGED WITH. [FALSE]
50. The sample size for the instructed group is too small to draw reliable conclusions
from this question.
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Uninstructed = 25.5% Instructed = 22.3% A = -3.2 p = .436
(192) (229)
This question was probably difficult for jurors because it is
long and it addresses specific intent as an abstract definition,
rather than as an element of a specific crime. More-educated ju-
rors scored significantly higher than less-educated jurors, but
even the instructed group with more education responded cor-
rectly only at a rate of about 36%. This can be interpreted as
indicating that receiving the instruction did not significantly im-
prove comprehension for the abstract meaning of specific intent.
The poor rate of correct response merits attention.
H. Assault (17:1:02, 17:6:01, 17:6:02)
11. AN ASSAULT MUST INCLUDE ACTUAL PHYSICAL INJURY TO THE
VICTIM. [FALSE]
Uninstructed = 49.6% Instructed = 32.3% A = -17.3 p = .060
(538) (31)
30. A DEFENDANT PURPOSELY AND VIOLENTLY STRUCK A VICTIM,
CAUSING PHYSICAL INJURY. THIS FORCEFUL TOUCHING IS
CALLED A BATTERY. [TRUE]
Uninstructed = 82.5% Instructed 72.2% A = -10.3 p = .314
(97) (18)
The results for the two questions on assault appear rather
counterintuitive and striking because the instructed group
scored lower than the uninstructed group. The significance level
for question 11 indicates that the decrease in juror comprehen-
sion after instruction on assault is a reliable measurement, by
social science standards. For question 30, however, the signifi-
cance level is well beyond that which indicates a reliable differ-
ence. The best conclusion for results from question 30 is that the
two groups do not actually differ.
It is clear that the instructions for assault did not improve
comprehension for the issues covered in either of these ques-
tions, and these instructions very likely worsened comprehension
for the issue covered in question 11. One possibility is that the
instructions are confusing to jurors. Postquestionnaire inter-
views with jurors would have helped determine the exact nature
of juror misunderstanding; however, we were not able to do this.
An alternative possibility is that the instructions were not
poor or misleading, but that unusual factors were present in one
or two trials in which jurors were exposed to these assault in-
structions. Even if only one jury were confused or somehow mis-
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led, its responses might be enough to lower significantly the
score of the entire instructed group, which had a sample size of
only thirty-one.
We were not able to distinguish among these possibilities us-
ing our methodology. Nevertheless, it is clear that instructions
do little to help jurors distinguish successfully assault from
battery.
I. Criminal Sexual Conduct (20:3:01; 20:3:02; 20:5:01; 20:5:02;
20:2:11; 20:2:12)
13. SECOND DEGREE CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT ALWAYS INVOLVES
PERSONAL INJURY AND PENETRATION. [FALSE] (20:3:01; 20:3:02)
Uninstructed = 64.4% Instructed = 100% A = 35.6% p = .026
(516) (9)
20. A JURY BELIEVES THAT A DEFENDANT COERCED A VICTIM INTO
TOUCHING HIS GROIN TO GET SEXUAL GRATIFICATION. THERE
WAS NO PHYSICAL INJURY TO THE VICTIM AND THE TOUCHING
WAS ONLY THROUGH THE CLOTHES. THE JURY MUST FIND THE
DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY OF ANY CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT.
[FALSE] (20:5:01; 20:5:02)
Uninstructed = 0.0% No instructed jurors A = N/A p = N/A
(413) (0)
31. IN CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT CASES, YOU CAN CONSIDER
MENTAL ANGUISH AS PERSONAL INJURY. [TRUE] (20:2:11;
20:2:12)
Uninstructed = 77.4% No instructed jurors A = N/A p = N/A
(124) (0).
Unfortunately, the questions that were asked about criminal
sexual conduct did not correspond to the instructions that were
most frequently given in such cases. Question 13 had one jury
that received instructions 20:2:01 or 20:2:02, resulting in a very
small sample size for the instructed group. Though the results
for question 13 are encouraging and statistically significant, a re-
liable analysis of relevant characteristics among jurors is hin-
dered by the small sample. For,,the other questions, comparisons
between instructed and uninstr~ucted groups can not be made.
J. Presumption of Innocence
29. IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL, A DEFENDANT IS CONSIDERED INNOCENT
UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY. [TRUE]
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Uninstructed = 95.8% Instructed = 97.4% A = 1.6 p = .460
(44) (77)
This question was presented originally as an example in the
instructions to the questionnaire. Yet some CJI Committee
members were curious about the rate of comprehension for this
fundamental issue. It therefore was included in the question-
naire itself. After the first hundred or so questionnaires pro-
duced an extremely high uninstructed comprehension level, the
question was omitted.
III. GENERAL FACTORS IN JUROR COMPREHENSION
The results from individual items seem discouraging. Compre-
hension levels are sometimes quite low for both uninstructed
and instructed jurors. Instructions often had little impact on
comprehension; sometimes, instruction actually decreased juror
comprehension. Yet if one looks at the effects of the instructions
across all items, the results are not quite as discouraging as they
first appear.
If we examine only those instructions that demonstrate a sta-
tistically significant effect (those with a p value of less than
0.05), we note that eight questions showed a positive effect of
instructions (questions 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 13, 25, and 26) and only one
showed a negative effect (question 10). Thus, it seems that when
instructions do produce an effect they produce a positive effect
on jurors' comprehension more often than they produce a nega-
tive effect. On the other hand, thirteen questions indicate that
instruction had no statistically significant effect on juror com-
prehension (questions 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23,
and 24).
A variety of other factors besides exposure to instructions may
have affebted the number of correct responses to this question-
naire. For instance, more-educated jurors might be expected to
score higher than less-educated jurors. This was a difficult issue
in constructing the questionnairexbecause. the questions necessa-
rily included some legal language-or unfamiliar concepts.
In order to test which factors were associated with correct re-
sponses on the questionnaire, a score reflecting the total number
of correct responses for each juror was calculated. Then, the to-
tal score was used as a dependent measure against which to test
the influence of several factors. These included the total number
of instructions heard by the juror, the juror's level of education,
age, and gender, and whether written or audiotaped instructions
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were provided to the juror. Analysis of variance was used to test
whether any of these factors, alone or in combination, affected
juror comprehension."
Not surprisingly, jurors who were exposed to more instruc-
tions generally answered more items correctly than jurors who
were exposed to fewer instructions. This confirms that juror
comprehension increased as a function of exposure to instruc-
tions. Though the difference between the means was highly sig-
nificant, the magnitude of the increase as a result of exposure to
more instructions was quite modest. This makes sense because
51. See supra note 39 for a brief description of analysis of variance. The number of
instructions was divided at the median, resulting in one group that received 12 or fewer
instructions and one group that received 13 or more of the instructions targeted by this
study. Education and age were similarly dichotomized around their respective medians
(13 years for education; 39 years for age). Gender and distribution of written copies are
naturally dichotomized. Analysis of variance was performed on all the factors. An F sta-
tistic, which is "the ratio of the variance between categories to the variance within cate-
gories," J. HEALEY, supra note 38, at 163, was also calculated for each factor. The greater
the F statistic, the less likely it is that an observation is due to random chance. Id. at
163-64. The following are the means (reported in percentage correct on the question-
naire), F statistics, and significance levels for each factor:
TABLE I
Means F p
number of instructions <13 47.1; 13 or more=51.7 4.63 .032
educational level <13=46.8; 13 or more=53.9 18.18 <.001
age <39=50.9; 39 or more=48.3 1.55 .213
gender male=52.9; female=46.7 19.77 <.001
copies provided no=49.3; yes=57.8 3.90 .049
These means cluster near 50%, which would suggest random guessing. However, nearly
all of the means for individual items differ significantly from chance, which contradicts
the notion that subjects guessed randomly on the questionnaire. Rather, the total score's
closeness to 50% is an artifact of combining individual items that show high (e.g., wit-
ness credibility) and low (e.g., reasonable doubt) levels of comprehension.
There were no two- or three-way interactions except between age and educational
level. Except for the effect of age, these are all significant main effects. This implies that
each of these factors contributes independently to comprehension and no factor depends
on levels of the other factors to have an influence.
Four factors affected overall comprehension: number of instructions heard, education,
gender, and provision of copies. These factors did not interact with each other. We chose
to discuss the effect of education level on the responses to individual questions because
the influence of education on comprehension was, for the most part, not difficult to inter-
pret. We did not discuss the effect of gender on responses to the individual questions
because we had no sound theoretical reason for this effect. We did not discuss the effect
of the provision of written copies on responses to individual questions because too few
juries received written copies.
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jurors who were exposed to many instructions would face more
of a memory burden, particularly if the instructions were part of
a complex trial, and may show a slower increase in comprehen-
sion, or even some decrease, as a result. Additionally, the num-
ber of instructions affected the total number of correct responses
independently of each of the other factors. This suggests that
the benefit of exposure to more instructions was about equal for
all groups (e.g., more-educated and less-educated jurors, older
and younger jurors, etc.).
Other factors influenced comprehension as well, including the
jurors' educational level and the use of written instructions. Ju-
rors with higher educational levels scored significantly higher
than jurors with lower educational levels. Giving more instruc-
tions simply raised the scores of both groups equally. The provi-
sion of written instructions also affected comprehension levels
significantly, with those who received instructions scoring higher
than those who did not. The effect of written instructions was
statistically significant despite relatively small sample
sizes-only nine percent of the instructed jurors received written
instructions.
The positive effect of written instructions conflicts with a re-
cent study by Heuer and Penrod.2 In a field study of Wisconsin
jurors, they found that the provision of written instructions did
not positively affect jurors' comprehension in criminal cases, as
assessed on a nine-item multiple-choice questionnaire. 53 It is not
immediately clear why their results conflict with the current re-
sults. In general, tests with more items are more discriminating,
provided that the items in the test have some relationship to the
dependent criterion (here, comprehension of particular instruc-
tions).5 4 It is possible that our twenty-six-item measure was
more sensitive to changes in comprehension as a result of writ-
ten instructions than their nine-item measure. In any event,
Heuer and Penrod do report that the provision of written in-
structions helped to resolve disputes among jurors over the
meaning of the law, and therefore had some positive effects. 5
The results of the questionnaire depended on gender. Men
scored higher than women. This effect was not a result of differ-
ences in educational levels between men and women, so it re-
mains unclear why men scored higher generally on this question-
52. Heuer & Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment With Written and Pre-
liminary Instructions, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409 (1989).
53. Id. at 420.
54. J. NUNNALLY, supra note 26, at 78.
55. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 52, at 421.
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naire. Finally, age was not independently significant in the
analysis of variance, although the number of correct answers in-
creased as juror age decreased. Subsequent analysis revealed
that younger persons in this study tended to have more educa-
tion, and it may be that the difference in education rather than
age produced this marginal effect.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This research supports a growing body of literature suggesting
that jury instructions are often lost on jurors, and can sometimes
even backfire." The relatively low rate of comprehension for
some concepts, both among more- and less-educated jurors, the
apparent ineffectiveness of instructions to improve comprehen-
sion, and the negative effect of certain instructions, constitute
the most striking findings in the present study. Particularly star-
tling are the results of instructions concerning reasonable doubt,
defendant impeachment by prior conviction, and some aspects
of mixed direct and circumstantial evidence.
Perhaps the study's results are not as surprising as they seem,
given the complexity of the cognitive task confronting jurors,
and the problematic nature of these particular instructions. One
possible explanation for the ineffebtiveness of instruction in
these particular areas is that jurors come to court with preexist-
ing beliefs about these issues that are resistant to change. For
instance, jurors' beliefs about what the law requires may be de-
rived from exposure to the media or other sources in the popular
• culture.5 7 Ideas learned over a lifetime of exposure to these
sources may be firmly entrenched and act as rules of thumb in
directing jurors' decisions.58 A few such "rules" may have driven
how jurors responded to several questions on this questionnaire.
For example: -
56. See, e.g., V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 121 (1986); E. LIND, The Psy-
chology of Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 27-29 (N. Kerr
& R. Bray eds. 1982).
57. Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington reported that videotaped mock jurors made in-
appropriate generalizations from television and film trials, and that "[niot even rein-
struction on the law from the judge was sufficieht' to eliminate all of these errors." R.
HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 170 (1983).
58. Belief perseverance, even in the face of disconforming or inconsistent evidence, is
well documented. See, e.g., Ross & Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process:
On the Origins and Maintainance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 149 (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky
eds. 1982).
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1. Jurors decide whom to believe and whom to disbelieve
(witness credibility).
2. Jurors should not use circumstantial evidence (mixed di-
rect and circumstantial evidence).
3. Jurors should not use a defendant's past record against
him (defendant impeachment by prior conviction).
When such preconceived notions are congruent with instruc-
tions, both uninstructed and instruction-benefitted comprehen-
sion levels appear quite high. But when preconceived notions are
incongruent with instructions, both uninstructed and instruc-
tion-benefitted comprehension levels remain low, well below
chance levels for some issues.
Some support for this notion can be found in a recent study
by Professor Ellsworth."9 She videotaped deliberations of mock
juries in order to investigate jurors' understanding and use of
facts and instructions. She concluded that:
Much of jurors' discussion of the law revolved around
phrases they were likely to have known before they heard
the judge's instructions. The instructions may have been
effective in reminding the jurors of terms they had heard
before, but the instructions were not very effective in ed-
ucating them in new areas, or even in focusing their at-
tention on the meaning of the familiar terms."
Some jury instructions did raise comprehension. When jurors
lack preconceptions or rules: of thumb, they are perhaps more
influenced by instructions, particularly if the instructions are
central to the case and find their way into discussion during de-
liberation. For instance, distinctions between first and second
degree murder are probably more obscure and therefore less en-
trenched and certain in jurors' minds. The jurors' open-ended
comments support this interpretation: instructions involving
homicide were often mentioned as being the most difficult to un-
derstand. Even though uninstructed comprehension may have
been above chance, jurors' responses showed that they were in-
fluenced positively by these instructions.
59. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One? 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205
(1989).
60. Id. at 219. Ellsworth also concl uded that the jury benefitted little from the ability
of its most able member to understand the meaning of instructions, id., a finding consis-
tent with our conclusion that it takes more than one person on a jury to understand an
instruction for the instruction to have its intended effects.
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A number of factors external to the instructions themselves
can influence comprehension. Some factors that influence juror
comprehension, such as jurors' educational level, are outside the
control of courts. Other factors, such as whether written instruc-
tions are provided, are potentially within the court's control. In
this sample, only nine percent of instructed juries received writ-
ten instructions. Several judges commented that they would like
to provide jurors with written instructions, but that the court
lacked time and resources to do so. This is unfortunate because
both the present results and the study by Heuer and Penrod
suggest that written copies of judicial instructions can help ju-
ries to use the instructions."' In discussion of this issue within
the CJI Committee, it was noted that the increased availability
of computers might lead to greater use of written instructions.
In particular, if criminal jury instructions were on file, one would
need only to retrieve and print the instructions to be used in a
given trial. Any modifications by the judge could be incorpo-
rated easily.
Clearly the more-educated jurors generally were likelier to
grasp the concepts conveyed by an instruction. They generally
had better uninstructed comprehension, and probably had bet-
ter retention of spoken distinctions or concepts. Given the tech-
nical/legal nature of the jury instructions, this advantage for
more-educated jurors will probably -always be a factor. As one
attempts to make instructions comprehensible to all jurors, in-
cluding less-educated jurors, there is likely to be a trade-off be-
tween comprehensibility and technical accuracy. Providing writ-
ten copies may narrow the comprehension gap between more-
and less-educated jurors, but the current data suggest that
more-educated jurors are more likely to comprehend legal con-
cepts regardless of whether written instructions are provided.
Jurors do not individually attempt to apply instructions to a
case but rather do so as a group. Therefore, the effects of jury
deliberation on comprehension are important and relevant here.
In the current study, the comprehension of instructed jurors was
tested after jury deliberation. Thus, our measure could not be
considered a pure measure of individual comprehension, because
postdeliberation responses may also reflect the influence of
group discussion.
The most optimistic theory about the influence of group delib-
eration on comprehension suggests that it takes only one person
to understand an instruction at the time it is given. If jury in-
61. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 52, at 429.
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structions are discussed later in deliberation, that person can
then explain the instruction to the remaining jurors. An alter-
nate theory is that a majority of jurors must understand an in-
struction at the time it is given. If the instruction is discussed,
then the majority viewpoint will prevail in applying the instruc-
tion. This research does not directly address how deliberation
influenced comprehension, but the current results are suggestive.
Because data were collected after deliberation, and because
open-ended questions revealed that most juries did discuss some
instructions, 2 it appears that the more optimistic theory may be
overly optimistic. 3
This research could not address certain issues. First, we could
not ascertain how variations in courtroom atmosphere or judges'
behavior and presentation style influence jurors' comprehension
of instructions. Presentation factors may be worth investigating
in further research on comprehension of instructions. Second,
the research could not confront the distinction between what ju-
rors believe the law requires and what standards jurors actually
use in making their decisions. We were careful to instruct jurors
to respond to the questions based on what the law required, not
on what they thought the law should be. Certainly most jurors
are inclined to follow the law, if they understand it. But jurors
sometimes do not conform their judgments to what the law re-
quires, either because they lack the cognitive control to ignore
certain variables, 4 or because they believe that the law conflicts
with some fundamental notions of fairness or rationality.
6 5
Finally, our procedure was designed to investigate the effec-
tiveness of selected Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions cur-
rently in use. The Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions Commit-
tee constantly revises instructions, and it is uncertain whether
differently worded instructions would result in similar rates of
comprehension among actual jurors.
At least two goals-legal accuracy and juror comprehension-
underlie the choice of wording in judicial instructions. There
62. Reasonable doubt was mentioned most frequently.
63. See Ellsworth, supra note 59, at 219.
64. See Kramer, Kerr & Carroll, supra note 32.
65. The jury has the power to nullify a judge's instructions. See Y. KAMISAR, W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 1295-97. As Justice Holmes stated: "[T]he jury has
the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts." Horning v. District of
Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920). For a case presenting both sides of this issue, see
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (upholding refusal to
instruct jury of its right to acquit defendants without regard to law and evidence) and
see id. at 1139 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that the jury should be told of its
nullification power).
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seems to exist an inherent tension, however, between communi-
cating to jurors the requirements of the law, and insuring that
instructions are technically complete and not reversible on ap-
pellate review. This tension has become more strained, for as
law becomes more developed and differentiated, it also becomes
more difficult for the layperson to understand. Designing in-
structions to improve comprehension may increase the chance of
appeal, but designing technical instructions to guard against ap-
peals may reduce juror comprehension, as indicated in the pre-
sent study. A misunderstanding of the law precludes jurors from
fulfilling their duties to the best of their abilities, as they sit in
judgment of their peers.
APPENDIX !
Jury Instructions Study Questionnaire
Today's Date Male or Female
Age - Education (highest grade completed)
Did you serve on a jury today? -Yes .- No
Have you ever served on a jury before today? -Yes -- No
If you have served on a jury, list the dates you served (as best you can recall).




Below are some True-False questions based on criminal jury instructions.
Please answer each question by circling either T (for True) or F (for False).
EXAMPLE:
T F A defendant has a right to remain silent.
You are not being tested. Rather, we are testing how clear the criminal jury
instructions are. When answering these questions, assume that you are a juror.
If you have heard jury instructions on the questions below, try to recall what
you heard. If you have not heard instructions or are not sure, pick the answer
that you think is the correct one.
Please answer every question.
T F 1. A reasonable doubt is based on your common sense.
T F 2. To be convicted of second degree murder, the defendant must have
premeditated a killing; that is,' he or she had to plan it out
beforehand.
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T F 3. Actual intent to kill or create a very high risk of death is required
for both first degree premeditated murder and voluntary
manslaughter.
T F 4. You have a reasonable doubt if you can see any possibility, no mat-
ter how slight, that the defendant is innocent. If so, you should find
the defendant not guilty.
T F 5. Facts can be proven through circumstantial evidence.
T F 6. Suppose that a defendant was robbing a gas station. He had not
planned to hurt anyone, but he got scared because he thought that
the attendant was reaching for a gun. He shot and killed the at-
tendant. You can still convict the defendant of first degree felony
murder.
T F 7. You can not consider a defendant's prior criminal convictions for
any purpose.
T F 8. Specific intent means that a defendant had planned to do at least
something illegal, regardless of whether he had planned to commit
the crime he is charged with.
T F 9. Suppose you see that your neighbor's drapes are closed. When you
look a minute later; you see the drapes open and the lights on. The
conclusion that someone is at home would be based on circumstan-
tial evidence.
T F 10. A reasonable doubt must be based only on the evidence that was
presented in the courtroom, not on any conclusion that you draw
from the evidence. '
T F 11. An assault must include actual physical injury to the victim.
T F 12. Suppose you learn that a defendant has several prior criminal con-
victions. Based on this fact, you can assume that there is a greater
chance that the defendant is guilty of the crime which he is now
charged with.
T F 13. Second degree criminal sexual conduct always involves personal in-
jury and penetration.
T F 14. Evidence that a defendant made plans to commit a crime is enough
to prove that he attempted it.
T F 15. In deciding whether to believe a witness, you may consider not only
what the witness said, but how he or she said it.
T F 16. A witness's statement that he or she saw something is an example
of direct evidence.
T F 17. Suppose that a defendant had planned a robbery or criminal sexual
conduct (rape). He then began to commit the crime. However, he
was interrupted and prevented from completing the crime. You can
still find him guilty of attempted robbery or attempted criminal
sexual conduct.
T F 18. If a witness is honest and confident, you can be certain that he or
she is accurate in their perception of events.
T F 19. The prosecutor may not build a case on circumstantial evidence
alone.
T F 20. A jury believes that a defendant coerced a victim into touching his
groin to get sexual gratification. There was no physical injury to the
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victim and the touching was only through the clothes. The jury
must find the defendant not guilty of any criminal sexual conduct.
T F 21. Suppose a defendant was strongly provoked by a victim, but killed
the victim later, after he cooled down. The most serious offense you
can convict the defendant on is manslaughter.
T F 22. To find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, you must
be 100% certain of the defendant's guilt.
T F 23. Suppose that a witness saw the defendant's automobile parked
near the scene of a crime. The conclusion that the defendant was in
the area would be based upon direct evidence.
T F 24. For first degree premeditated murder, it doesn't matter whether
the defendant intended to kill the victim. If the victim was killed
by the defendant's actions, that is enough.
T F 25. You can consider a defendant's prior criminal convictions in decid-
ing whether to believe the defendant's testimony.
T F 26. To be convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a defendant must have
killed while influenced by circumstances that normally would pro-
duce strong feelings or passion. The killing must have occurred
before a normal person would have had time to stop and think
about that he was about to do. ,
T F 27. Suppose that a defendant was grossly negligent and careless in his
actions. His actions caused someone's death. Though the death was
an accident and not at all intended, you can find the defendant
guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Please answer the following questions. Feel free to write on the back if you
would like more room. Your thoughts and opinions are important.
Were there any instructions which you or any of the other jurors found confus-
ing? If so, please list what these instructions were about. Also, for each instruc-
tion, please tell us what made the instruction confusing.
1. Instruction:
la. What made the instructions confusing or hard to understand?
2. Instruction:
2a. What made the instructions confusing or hard to understand?
3. Instruction:
3a. What made the instructions confusing or hard to understand?
4. Instruction:
4a. What made the instructions confusing or hard to understand?
If you sat on a jury today, did your jury discuss the meaning of the jury in-
structions? - Yes - No If yes, which instructions were discussed?
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We would welcome any comments about the jury instructions or your experi-
ence with them.
Comments:
APPENDIX II: COMPOSITE INSTRUCTIONS
CJI 3:1:04
Definition of Reasonable Doubt
A reasonable doubt is a fair, honest doubt growing out of the
evidence or lack of evidence in this case or growing out of any
reasonable or legitimate inferences drawn from the evidence or
the lack of evidence. It is not merely an imaginary doubt or a
flimsy, fanciful doubt or a doubt based upon the mere possibility
of the innocence of the defendant or a doubt based upon sympa-
thy, but rather it is a fair, honest doubt based upon reason and
common sense. It is a state of mind which would cause you to
hesitate in making an important decision in your own personal
life. By stating that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, I mean there must be such evidence that
causes you to have a firm conviction to a moral certainty of the
truth of the charge here made against the defendant.
USE NOTE: The jury must be instructed on the concepts of
the presumption of innocence, burden of proof and reasonable
doubt.
CJI 3:1:05
Definition of Reasonable Doubt (Alternate)
A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt growing out of the testi-
omony, the lack of testimony or the unsatisfactory nature of the
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testimony in the case. It is not a mere imaginary or possible
doubt, but a fair doubt based on reason and common sense. It is
such a doubt as to leave your minds, after a careful examination
of all the evidence in the case, in the condition that you cannot
say you have an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the
truth of the charge here made against the defendant.

